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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
Altigraci Rosario challenges her conviction on two counts 
of passing United States Treasury checks in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 510(a). Of primary importance on appeal is 
Rosario's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence with 
regard to Count 1 of the indictment. We must decide 
whether a conviction for passing a treasury check can be 
sustained based solely on evidence establishing that the 
defendant possessed the check and that it was "probable" 
that the defendant had signed the check. We conclude that 




Altigraci Rosario operated a tax preparation service in 
Hightstown, New Jersey. Jose Rios, Rosario's nephew by 
marriage, was employed by Rosario and assisted with her 
tax preparation service. In February 1993, the U.S. 
Treasury Department mailed a Treasury check to Angel and 
Ana Andrade in the amount of $2,996.00. Soon thereafter, 
the Andrades filed a complaint with the Treasury 
Department alleging that they had not received the check. 
 
On January 11, 1994, the New Jersey National/ 
Corestates Bank notified the U.S. Secret Service that Jose 
Rios had deposited the Andrade check into his account at 
the bank. That same day, the Secret Service interviewed 
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Rios. During the interview, Rios stated that Rosario had 
given him the signed check and asked him to cash it. Rios 
apparently received a $20 fee for executing the transaction. 
 
In September 1993, the U.S. Treasury Department mailed 
a tax refund check to Ivan Vitiello in the amount of 
$1,943.03. Subsequently, Vitiello filed a complaint with the 
Treasury Department alleging that he had not received the 
check. In his complaint, Vitiello identified Altigraci Rosario 
as his tax preparer. Vitiello stated that he had authorized 
Rosario to have the check delivered to her post office box, 
but he had not authorized her to cash the check. 
 
On May 4, 1994, a U.S. Postal Inspector confirmed that 
Vitiello's check had been delivered to a post office box 
registered to Altigraci Rosario and Jose Rios. That same 
day, the Vitiello check was cashed at Reed's Garage in 
Cranbury, New Jersey. Employees of Reed's Garage 
informed the government that Rosario and Rios had cashed 
the Vitiello check. Sometime later, the government 
identified Rosario's fingerprint on the check. 
 
On November 18, 1994, the government filed a two-count 
misdemeanor complaint against Rosario, charging her with 
negotiating two checks bearing forged endorsements in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 510(a) and § 510(c). Count 1 of the 
indictment related to the Andrade check and Count 2 
related to the Vitiello check. After a one-day jury trial, 
Rosario was convicted on both counts.1  
 
At trial, Angel and Ana Andrade testified that they had 
never met Rosario, used her service or authorized her or 
anyone else to endorse their check. Rios, the prosecution's 
chief witness, testified that Rosario had given him the 
Andrade check, which had been endorsed, along with a 
form of identification of the payee. Rosario asked Rios to 
cash the check, informing him that the payee did not have 
a bank account and therefore could not cash the check. 
(Apparently, Rios had a substantial amount of cash in a 




1. Because Rosario does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 
with regard to Count 2, relating to the Vitiello check, we will not discuss 
the proof offered at trial with regard to that count. 
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Rios further testified that he had not met the persons 
whom Rosario told him had given her the check. Indeed, 
Rios stated that he "didn't even see the people." App. at 
47A. According to Rios, he took the Andrade check from 
Rosario, photocopied the identification and gave Rosario the 
cash, less a $20 fee. Rios stated that he did not actually see 
Rosario hand the cash over to any person who might be 
associated with the check, but that he did see her "talking 
to someone." App. at 49A. 
 
Finally, Rios testified that after the bank informed him 
that the Andrade check had been reported stolen, he looked 
for the photocopy that he had made of the identification but 
could not find it. When he informed Rosario about the 
check, Rios acknowledged that she seemed "genuinely 
surprised" that the check had been reported stolen. App. at 
54A. 
 
The government supplemented the testimony of Rios with 
the testimony of a handwriting expert, Secret Service 
document examiner Jeffrey Taylor. After comparing the 
signature for Ana Andrade that appeared on the check with 
a known sample of Rosario's handwriting, Taylor testified 
that Rosario "probably" had forged the check herself -- that 
is, it was "more likely than not" that she had done so. 
Essentially, the testimony of Rios, Taylor and the Andrades 
constituted the entirety of the government's case on Count 
1 of the indictment. 
 
After the jury rendered its verdict, Rosario filed a Rule 29 
motion for judgment of acquittal on Count 1 with the 
magistrate judge, arguing, inter alia, that the evidence was 
insufficient to sustain a conviction.2  The magistrate judge 
denied Rosario's post-trial motions. See United States v. 
Rosario, Crim. No. 94-5050K-01 (D.N.J. May 9, 1995).3 On 
June 2, 1995, the magistrate judge sentenced Rosario to 
eight months in prison on both counts to be served  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Rosario also moved for a new trial on both counts based upon the 
magistrate judge's allegedly erroneous ruling on her motion in limine. 
 
3. The magistrate judge had jurisdiction to serve as trial judge over 
Rosario's trial pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3401, which allows a magistrate 
judge to try and sentence persons accused and convicted of 
misdemeanor offenses. 
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concurrently.4 At the time of sentencing, Rosario was 
already serving a one-year sentence for an unrelated 
bribery conviction. 
 
Rosario then appealed the magistrate judge's decision to 
the district court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3402.5 The 
district court affirmed Rosario's conviction and sentence in 
all respects. See United States v. Rosario, Crim. No. 96-277 
(D.N.J. April 3, 1996). On this appeal, Rosario's primary 
challenge to her conviction is that the evidence offered at 
trial was insufficient to support the jury's conviction on 
Count 1.6 
 
The district court had jurisdiction over the criminal 
proceedings pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have 




Our review of a sufficiency of the evidence challenge is 
guided by strict principles of deference to a jury's verdict. 
United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 613 (1996). We must view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the government and 
must sustain a jury's verdict if "a reasonable jury believing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Rosario was also ordered to pay restitution in the amounts of 
$2,996.00 and $1,934.00 to the victims and to pay aggregated special 
assessments of $50.00. 
 
5. That statute provides: 
 
In all cases of conviction by a United States magistrate an appeal of 
right shall lie from the judgment of the magistrate to a judge of the 
district court of the district in which the offense was committed. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3402. 
 
6. Rosario also raises again the argument that the magistrate judge erred 
by denying her motion in limine to exclude the admission of her prior 
bribery conviction. We decline to address the merits of the magistrate's 
in limine ruling because, by not testifying at trial, Rosario has failed to 
preserve this issue for appeal. See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 
(1984) (holding that in order to raise and preserve for review the claim 
of improper impeachment with a prior conviction, a defendant must 
testify); United States v. Moskovits, 86 F.3d 1303, 1305-06 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(same), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 968 (1997). 
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the government's evidence could find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the government proved all the elements of the 
offenses." United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1113 (3d 
Cir. 1991). Accordingly, "[a] claim of insufficiency of the 
evidence places a very heavy burden on the appellant." 
United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1243 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
Rosario was convicted of check forgery under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 510(a)(2), which provides: 
 
(a) Whoever, with intent to defraud-- 
 
. . . . 
 
(2) passes, utters, or publishes, or attempts to pass, 
utter, or publish, any Treasury check or bond or 
security of the United States bearing a falsely made or 
forged endorsement or signature; 
 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
than ten years, or both. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 510(a)(2). 
 
At trial, the magistrate instructed the jury that, under 
the statute, the government was required to prove the 
following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
 
(1) that the defendant passed or attempted to pass  a 
U.S. Treasury check, 
 
(2) that the check bore a forged or falsely made 
endorsement, 
 
(3) that the defendant passed the check with inten t to 
defraud, and 
 
(4) that the defendant acted knowingly and willfully. 
 
Rosario, Crim. No. 94-5050K-01, slip op. at 7. 
 
Rosario contends that the government failed to meet its 
burden on elements (2), (3) & (4). Specifically, she argues 
that Rios's testimony establishing that she possessed the 
check was insufficient to corroborate the testimony of the 
handwriting expert that she probably forged the check. 
 
As noted earlier, Taylor testified that it was "probable" 
that Rosario had forged the check. "Probable" is a term of 
 
                                6 
art used by Secret Service document examiners. The 
"probable" category falls exactly in the middle of the six- 
point spectrum between "positive identification" and 
"positive elimination." Thus, handwriting experts will use 
the term "probable" to describe 
 
times when the evidence falls considerably short of the 
"virtually certain" category and yet still points rather 
strongly toward the suspect, i.e., there are several 
significant similarities present between the questioned 
and known writings, but there are also a number of 
irreconcilable differences and the examiner suspects 
that they are due to some factor but cannot safely 
attribute the lack of agreement to the effect of that 
factor. 
 
Thomas V. Alexander, Definition of Handwriting Opinions, 
App. at 37A. 
 
The government concedes that Taylor's testimony alone 
would be insufficient to sustain a conviction under § 510(a). 
The government argues, however, that Taylor's testimony 
that Rosario probably forged the check, coupled with Rios's 
testimony that Rosario had given him the check, would 
allow the jury to make the inference that Rosario had 
forged the check. Moreover, according to the government, 
once the jury concluded that Rosario had forged the check, 
it could logically conclude that she had done so knowingly 
and willfully and with intent to defraud. We agree. By 
establishing that Rosario possessed the check, and thus 
had the opportunity to forge it, the government provided 
validation for Taylor's testimony that Rosario had probably 
forged the check.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Once the jury was provided with enough information to conclude that 
Rosario had forged the check, it certainly could have inferred that she 
acted knowingly and willfully and with the intent to defraud. Of course, 
the requisite state of mind elements only follow if the jury believed that 
Rosario did, in fact, forge the check. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 632 
F.2d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that once forgery was established, 
inferences of knowledge and unlawful intention followed). Given the 
Andrades' testimony that they did not know Rosario nor authorize her to 
endorse the check, the jury could have assumed that Rosario forged the 
endorsement of the check with the requisite intent to defraud. 
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In reaching this conclusion, we are persuaded by the 
reasoning put forth in United States v. Richardson, 755 
F.2d 685 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) and United States v. 
Rivamonte, 666 F.2d 515 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). In 
both Richardson and Rivamonte, as here, the handwriting 
expert's testimony established only that it was "probable" 
that the defendant had forged the check. 
 
In Richardson, the court upheld a check forgery 
conviction challenged on insufficiency grounds. The 
handwriting expert testified that Richardson had "probably" 
signed the check. This testimony was supplemented by 
evidence that Richardson had access to a key to the 
victim's home, that she had made a deposit in the exact 
same amount as the stolen check, and that her fingerprints 
were on the stolen check. In upholding the conviction, the 
court concluded that this was "ample evidence to support 
the verdict." Richardson, 755 F.2d at 686. 
 
Similarly, in Rivamonte, the court upheld a check forgery 
conviction based on the following evidence: a handwriting 
expert's testimony that the defendant had "probably" signed 
the check; the defendant's fingerprints were on the check; 
the defendant's account number was written on the back of 
the check; and the payees' names were written on the 
defendant's pre-encoded deposit slip. Rivamonte, 666 F.2d 
at 516-17. The court held that "a jury reasonably could 
conclude that this evidence is inconsistent with every 
reasonable hypothesis of appellant's innocence." Id. at 517. 
 
Although in Richardson and Rivamonte the government 
offered slightly more circumstantial evidence than was 
offered at Rosario's trial, we are nevertheless convinced that 
the evidence establishing that the respective defendants 
had possessed the check was of primary significance in 
those cases. Our conclusion is bolstered by the Eleventh 
Circuit's post-Rivamonte decision in United States v. 
Henderson, 693 F.2d 1028 (11th Cir. 1982). In Henderson, 
the court reversed a check forgery conviction based solely 
on ambiguous handwriting testimony and evidence showing 
that the defendant's wife had cashed the stolen check. The 
government offered no evidence that Henderson had ever 
possessed the check. Distinguishing Rivamonte, the court 
noted: 
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Although both Rivamonte and the present appeal had 
handwriting experts testify that the respective 
defendants "probably" endorsed the checks, the 
additional evidence in Rivamonte constituted sufficient 
evidence to sustain a conviction. The fingerprints and 
the defendant's account number support the 
conclusion drawn by the handwriting expert in 
Rivamonte. 
 
Henderson, 693 F.2d at 1032. 
 
Here, although Rosario's fingerprints were not found on 
the check, Rios's testimony established that Rosario was in 
possession of the check. Thus, Rios's testimony that 
Rosario possessed the check provided the same 
corroboration for the handwriting expert's testimony that 
the fingerprint evidence in Rivamonte and Richardson did. 
See also United States v. Chatman, 557 F.2d 147, 148 (8th 
Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (upholding check forgery conviction 
because accessibility of payee's mailbox to defendant 
provided corroboration for less than conclusive expert 
handwriting testimony). 
 
In our view, because the evidence established that 
Rosario did, in fact, possess the check, the jury could have 
used that fact to corroborate the handwriting expert's 
testimony that she had probably forged the signature on 
the check. While neither of these factors independently 
would be sufficient to support a conviction, taken together 
they are sufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We are not persuaded by Rosario's attempt to characterize Rios's 
testimony as "exculpatory" for her. Using Rios's testimony, Rosario 
implies that she merely unknowingly passed the forged check to Rios 
and then passed along the cash to the person or persons who brought 
in the check. Rosario finds further support for her theory from Rios's 
testimony that she was "genuinely surprised" when he reported that the 
check was stolen. 
 
As the district court pointed out, however, the jury was not required 
to believe that Rosario made any of the arguably exculpatory out-of-court 
statements to Rios. Rosario, Crim. No. 96-277, slip op. at 6. And, in any 
event, the statements she relies on are not inconsistent with guilt. 
Simply stated, the jury had no reason to believe that Rosario was being 
truthful with Rios. Indeed, the jury could have just as well believed that 
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Finally, we acknowledge that this is a close case. Indeed, 
were we sitting as triers of fact, we very well may have come 
to a different conclusion than the jury did here. 
Nevertheless, we cannot say that there was insufficient 
evidence to support the jury's verdict. Accordingly, we 




Rosario's statements to Rios served to deceive him into believing that she  
had unwittingly passed the forged check. After all, it certainly served 
Rosario's interests for Rios to believe the check transaction was  
legitimate because Rios may have been less willing to cash the check 
had he known it was stolen. 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
The government argues that the combination of wholly 
ambiguous testimony from a handwriting expert and 
equivocal testimony from a witness receiving favorable 
treatment from the government is sufficient to support the 
conviction of Altigraci Rosario for passing a United States 
Treasury check. The majority accepts this argument. I do 
not; hence, I dissent. 
 
To convict Rosario of check forgery under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 510(a)(2), the government was required to prove four 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the check 
was a U.S. Treasury check; (2) that the check bore a forged 
or falsely made endorsement; (3) that Rosario passed the 
check with intent to defraud; and (4) that Rosario acted 
knowingly and willfully. There was no direct evidence 
adduced at trial to satisfy the government's burden on 
elements (2), (3) and (4). Recognizing this, the government 
nonetheless asks us to cobble together a series of 
inferences to support the jury's verdict. It argues that, 
taken collectively, the testimony of Taylor, the handwriting 
expert, and Rios, the man who negotiated the stolen check, 
are sufficient to permit the jury to infer that Rosario forged 
the check. Building on this inference, it then claims that 
the jury could draw the further inferences that Rosario 
possessed the requisite knowledge, willfulness and intent to 
defraud necessary to satisfy the remaining elements of the 
charged offense. In my view, these "inferences" do no more 
than permit the jury to speculate that Rosario is guilty, 
especially in light of the weak testimony from which these 
inferences are drawn. 
 
Jeffrey Taylor, the government's handwriting "expert," 
could only testify that Rosario "probably" signed the name 
"Ana Andrade" to the back of the Andrades' check. The trial 
record shows, however, that Taylor's testimony was even 
more ambiguous. Indeed, under cross-examination Taylor 
conceded that there were a number of "irreconcilable 
differences" between the Ana Andrade signature on the 
check and Rosario's sample signature. App. at 35A. 
Moreover, Taylor candidly admitted that there was "some 
doubt" in his mind as to whether Rosario signed Ana 
Andrade's name on the check. App. at 35A-36A. 
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Significantly, Taylor also acknowledged on direct 
examination that he "found no evidence that [Rosario] wrote 
the remaining signature [Angel Andrade's] on that check." 
App. at 32A. Taylor's concessions make his already 
equivocal conclusion that Rosario "probably" forged Ana 
Andrade's name on the check even less reliable. I would 
conclude that inferences drawn from such clearly 
ambiguous testimony cannot possibly satisfy the 
government's burden of establishing beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Rosario forged Ana Andrade's signature on the 
check. 
 
Recognizing the inherent weakness of Taylor's vague 
opinion, the government would have us rely on the 
testimony of Rios for support that Rosario forged the check. 
Rios's testimony, it argues, establishes that Rosario both 
possessed and had the opportunity to forge the check, 
thereby allowing the jury to infer that Rosario did, in fact, 
forge Ana Andrade's signature on the check. By presenting 
evidence that Rosario possessed the check and had the 
opportunity to sign it, the government contends that it 
provided validation for Taylor's equivocal opinion that 
Rosario probably forged the check. In support of its 
argument, the government relies primarily on two cases 
where courts affirmed forgery convictions based in part on 
testimony from a handwriting expert indicating that the 
defendant had "probably" forged the stolen check. See 
United States v. Richardson, 755 F.2d 685 (8th Cir. 1985) 
(per curiam); United States v. Rivamonte, 666 F.2d 515 
(11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). 
 
In my view, however, reliance on Richardson and 
Rivamonte is imprudent for a number of reasons. First, 
notwithstanding the assertion that the government offered 
only "slightly" more circumstantial evidence in Richardson 
and Rivamonte than that adduced here, Maj. Opinion at 8, 
the records in those cases demonstrate that there was 
ample evidence tending to establish all elements of those 
check forgery convictions. 
 
For example, in Richardson, the court affirmed a check 
forgery conviction where the handwriting expert's testimony 
was complemented by evidence showing that Richardson 
had a key to the home where the check was stolen, 
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Richardson's fingerprints were found on the stolen check, a 
stolen deposit slip was used to cash the check, and 
Richardson had made a deposit in the exact same amount 
as the stolen check during the time period in which the 
stolen check was cashed. 755 F.2d at 686. 
 
Similarly, in Rivamonte, the court affirmed a check 
forgery conviction where the expert's opinion was 
complemented by evidence showing that Rivamonte's 
fingerprints and palmprints were found on the check, the 
defendant's account number was written on the back of the 
check, the payee's names were written on Rivamonte's pre- 
encoded deposit slip, and a deposit was made in the 
defendant's account on the same day that the stolen check 
was negotiated. 666 F.2d at 516-17. 
 
In each case, the government proffered strong 
circumstantial evidence specifically related to the respective 
defendants' possession of the stolen checks, their intent to 
defraud and their states of mind. Such was not the case 
here, where the government, lacking sufficient evidence to 
establish any of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, 
was forced to ask the jury to speculate that Rosario forged 
the check, passed the check with intent to defraud, and 
acted with requisite knowledge and willfulness. 
 
I do not believe we can contort Richardson and Rivamonte 
to support the proposition that testimony from a 
handwriting expert indicating that a defendant "probably" 
forged a stolen check in conjunction with evidence showing 
possession of the stolen check by the defendant constitutes 
sufficient evidence to affirm a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 510(a)(2). Simply stated, there is no such baseline 
position established in the case law. Instead, Richardson 
and Rivamonte suggest that an "expert" opinion that the 
defendant probably forged the check, coupled with 
sufficient additional circumstantial evidence demonstrating 
possession, willfulness, knowledge and intent to defraud, is 
necessary before a conviction will be affirmed. 
 
United States v. Hall, 632 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1980), is not 
to the contrary. In Hall, the court held that once forgery is 
conclusively proven, inferences of fact regarding possession, 
intent and knowledge can be permissibly drawn by the 
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government. Id. at 502. The handwriting expert in Hall, 
however, provided an unequivocal opinion that the 
defendant had forged the payee's name on the stolen check, 
thereby providing the government with conclusive factual 
proof of the forgery element of the offense from which 
inferences tending to establish the other elements of the 
offense could be drawn. Id. Here, in contrast, the 
government has offered only ambiguous, inconclusive 
testimony regarding the forgery element of the offense. As 
such, there is no conclusively proven fact of forgery from 
which the government could draw inferences tending to 
establish the other elements of the offense of conviction. 
 
My interpretation of the case law is supported by the 
post-Rivamonte decision in United States v. Henderson, 693 
F.2d 1028 (11th Cir. 1982), which, in my view, does not 
bolster the government's argument. In Henderson, the court 
reversed a check forgery conviction based on ambiguous 
handwriting testimony and circumstantial evidence tending 
to show that the defendant's wife had cashed the stolen 
check. In reaching its decision, the court reasoned as 
follows: 
 
Although it is apparent that someone endorsed Mr. 
Moore's signature on the back of the treasury check, 
the evidence was not sufficient for a fair jury to 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. 
Henderson was the endorser. The evidence, because it 
was circumstantial required that the jury draw an 
inference that because Ms. Henderson used the 
defendant's car to cash the check, and because Ms. 
Henderson did cash the check, the defendant must 
have signed the check. This simply does not follow. It 
is unreasonable to infer Mr. Henderson's guilt based 
upon the actions of his wife. Yet, it is apparent from 
the evidence that there was little else upon which to 
base a conviction. . . . Although circumstantial evidence 
is testimony to the surrounding facts and 
circumstances of the point at issue, they must at some 
point connect, to allow the trier of fact to draw the 
inference that the fact asserted is true. 
 
Id. at 1031 (internal citation omitted). The court then 
proceeded to distinguish Rivamonte on the basis of the 
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strength of the additional evidence offered by the 
government in that case. As the Henderson court 
concluded: "In the present case, the additional evidence, 
together with the handwriting expert's `probable' testimony, 
is not sufficient." 693 F.2d at 1032. Significantly, there is 
nothing in the Henderson decision to suggest that the court 
viewed the failure of the government to produce evidence 
showing that Mr. Henderson possessed the stolen check as 
determinative of the sufficiency of the evidence. Rather, the 
Henderson court reviewed the proffered evidence in its 
entirety and determined that there was insufficient evidence 
supplementing the ambiguous handwriting testimony to 
permit a reasonable jury to conclude beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Mr. Henderson was guilty of the offense of 
conviction.1 
 
Notwithstanding the absence of any legal precedent for 
its conclusion that ambiguous handwriting evidence 
coupled with evidence of possession constitutes sufficient 
evidence to affirm a conviction under § 510(a), the 
government speciously reasons that Rosario's conviction 
was proper because Rios's testimony that Rosario 
possessed the check provided the same corroboration for 
the handwriting expert's testimony that the fingerprint 
evidence in Rivamonte and Richardson did. What this bit of 
forensic gymnastics neglects to explain, however, is that the 
government's fingerprint expert was unable to identify any 
finger or palm prints belonging to Rosario on the Andrade 
check. App. at 42A-43A. Thus, the government was forced 
to rely on Rios's testimony as the "equivalent" of fingerprint 
evidence precisely because there was no fingerprint 
evidence available to support the conclusion that Rosario 
forged Ana Andrade's name on the back of the stolen check. 
Rather than lend credibility to the ambiguous handwriting 
testimony offered in this case, the government's reliance on 
Rios's testimony highlights the dearth of evidence offered by 
the government to meet its burden of proof. Simply stated, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The majority correctly states that in Henderson the government offered 
no evidence that Mr. Henderson had ever possessed the stolen check. 
Maj. Opinion at 8. I note, however, that the government similarly failed 
to offer any evidence specifically relating to Mr. Henderson's intent to 
defraud, knowledge or state of mind. 
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aside from Rios's testimony the government failed to 
adduce any additional evidence to validate Taylor's 
equivocal conclusion that Rosario signed the stolen check. 
Lacking further additional evidence like that offered in the 
Rivamonte and Richardson cases (e.g., fingerprints, 
palmprints, pre-coded deposit slips), I fail to understand 
how Rios's testimony could possibly transform Taylor's 
ambiguous conclusion into factual proof sufficient to 
establish Rosario's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
Finally, I am concerned because parts of Rios's testimony 
directly contradict inferences that the jury was supposed to 
have drawn from Rios's testimony. For instance, on cross- 
examination Rios testified that Rosario did not know that 
the check was stolen. App. at 52A. Such testimony clearly 
undercuts the idea that the jury could infer that Rosario 
had the requisite knowledge and intent to defraud 
necessary to support a conviction under § 510(a)(2). 
Moreover, it also puts the majority in the awkward position 
of relying on Rios's testimony in order to bolster the 
inferences that Rosario possessed and forged the stolen 
check, but ignoring Rios's testimony in order to draw the 
inferences that Rosario had the requisite knowledge and 
state of mind necessary to support her conviction. Such 
inconsistencies further reinforce my conclusion that the 
evidence proffered in this case permitted the jury to do little 
more than speculate as to Rosario's guilt. 
 
In summary, I believe that the evidence adduced by the 
government at trial falls far below the horizon of certainty 
we require in criminal prosecutions and is not sufficient to 
convict Rosario beyond a reasonable doubt. Handwriting 
analysis is at best an inexact science, and at worst mere 
speculation itself. See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger et al., 
Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: 
The Lessons of Handwriting Identification "Expertise", 137 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 731, 739 (1989) (reporting that "[f]rom the 
perspective of published empirical verification, handwriting 
identification expertise is almost nonexistent"). As such, I 
do not believe that wholly ambiguous testimony from a 
handwriting "expert" and selected testimony from a witness 
receiving favorable treatment from the government can 
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satisfy the government's burden of proof. Accordingly, I 
would reverse Rosario's conviction. 
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